# AppDataStorageProvider Path Traversal Deserialization Vulnerability (CVE-2026-13186)

## Description

June 2026 - [CVE-2026-13186](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-13186)

* Progress® Telerik® UI for AJAX 2026.2.519 or earlier.

### What Are the Impacts

In Progress® Telerik® UI for AJAX prior to v2026.2.708, a path traversal vulnerability in the file-based persistence storage provider allows an attacker to influence which file is loaded as persistence state, enabling attacker-controlled deserialization and remote code execution.

### Is My Application Vulnerable?

Your application may be vulnerable if **all** of the following are true:

* `RadPersistenceManager` uses file-based storage and the storage key can be influenced by user-controlled input (e.g. a query string parameter, form field, or cookie value).

Risk is **significantly elevated** if another feature in the application allows writing files to the server's `App_Data` directory.

## Issue

* CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
* CAPEC-126: Path Traversal

## Solution

We have addressed the issue and the Progress Telerik team strongly recommends performing an upgrade to the latest version listed in the table below.

| Current Version                              | Update to                     |
| -------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------- |
| `>= 2013.1.220` && `<= 2026.2.519` (2026 Q2) | `>= 2026.2.708` (2026 Q2 SP1) |

Follow the [update instructions](https://www.telerik.com/products/aspnet-ajax/documentation/upgrade-compatibility/upgrading-instructions/upgrading-a-trial-to-a-developer-license-or-to-a-newer-version) for precise instructions. All customers who have a license for Progress® Telerik® UI for AJAX can access their downloads here [Product Downloads | Your Account](https://www.telerik.com/account/downloads/product-download).

## Mitigation

If an immediate upgrade is not possible, apply the following measures to reduce risk.

### Mitigation 1 — Ensure the persistence storage key is not derived from user input

The default storage key is a fixed value and is safe. This vulnerability only affects applications that explicitly set the key to a value taken from request data (query string, form field, or cookie).

If you have not changed the key in your code, you are **not affected** by this specific issue.

If you do set it, ensure the value comes from server-side state only:

```csharp
// Safe — hardcoded application key
PersistenceManager1.StorageProviderKey = "my-app-persistence-state";

// Safe — authenticated user identity (requires authentication, not for anonymous scenarios)
PersistenceManager1.StorageProviderKey = User.Identity.Name;

// UNSAFE — never derive from request data
// PersistenceManager1.StorageProviderKey = Request.QueryString["userId"];
// PersistenceManager1.StorageProviderKey = Request.Form["stateKey"];
// PersistenceManager1.StorageProviderKey = Request.Cookies["stateId"].Value;
```

### Mitigation 2 — Move the `RadAsyncUpload` temporary folder outside `App_Data` (defense-in-depth)

The default upload temp directory is within `App_Data`. Moving it removes a well-known write location that the attack chain depends on to place files within reach of the file-based persistence storage.

> **Important:** This is a defense-in-depth measure only. It is **not** a substitute for Mitigation 1. If the storage key remains user-controlled, a path traversal using relative path sequences may still reach the new directory. Always apply Mitigation 1 first.

```xml

<appSettings>
  
  <add key="Telerik.AsyncUpload.TemporaryFolder" value="~/UploadTemp" />
</appSettings>
```

> Create the `UploadTemp` folder manually before deploying and ensure the application pool identity has write permissions to it.

## Notes

* If you have any questions or concerns related to this issue, open a new Technical Support case in [Your Account | Support Center](https://www.telerik.com/account/support-center/contact-us/). Technical Support is available to customers with an active support plan.
* We would like to thank the researchers at Code White Security GmbH for their responsible disclosure and cooperation.

## External References

[CVE-2026-13186](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-13186) (High)

**CVSS:** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (8.1)

In Progress® Telerik® UI for AJAX prior to v2026.2.708, a path traversal vulnerability in file-based persistence storage can enable attacker-controlled deserialization and remote code execution.

Discoverer Credit: Markus Wulftange with CODE WHITE GmbH
